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ARTICLES

Mortgage Priority Problems: The
New Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act
and the Impact of the Uniform Acts
ROBERT KRATOVIL*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Among the most complex problems in real estate mortgage law
are those involving mortgages that secure advances to be made in the
future. The problems relate to the priority of those liens that intervene
between the future advances. The most common example of mortgages
securing future advances are construction loans, where typically the
funds are advanced in installments as work progresses. The mortgagor's obligation to repay will be represented by a promissory note or
similar document, and will be secured by the mortgage.
Construction lending involves a more exacting procedure than
that of a normal mortgage incident to a land purchase. Construction
lending presents a far greater risk to the mortgagee, than does lending
upon a completed structure.' This is because the value of the real
estate for security purposes is entirely dependent upon the happening
of a future event the completion of the building or project. If the
construction is, for some reason, not completed by the mortgagor,
the construction lender may find himself in the unhappy position of
being compelled to complete the building at his own expense. You
can not rent a half-completed building.
At the same time, however, the identical difficulties that placed
the lender in an insecure position usually prevent payment to the
subcontractors, workmen, and materials suppliers to the construction
project. Mechanics and materialmen are awarded liens on the real
estate which they have improved. 2 They and other lien holders may
* Distinguished Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago,

Illinois.

1. Kratovil & Werner, Mortgages for Construction and the Lien Priorities
Problem - The "Unobligatory" Advance, 41 TENN. L. Rv. 311 (1974) [hereinafter
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liens of all kinds to intervene between construction disbursements.
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enforce their liens just as the mortgagee can. But, since generally the
proceeds from a subsequent foreclosure and sale of a distressed project
are never large enough to satisfy all debts, namely, the debt secured
by the mortgage and any other liens that attach during the construction
period, such as judgment liens against the mortgagor, the courts have
had to consider disputes as to the priority of these claims. In all states
considerable confusion has existed as to the respective priorities of a
lender under a construction mortgage to secure future advances and
subsequent lien holders whose interests attach between the time the
mortgage is recorded and the making of an advance of construction
funds.
The Illinois legislature, in awareness of the economic problems
and legal obstacles faced by the construction market, has greatly
revised and improved the Illinois law of mortgages.' Section 15-1302
of the Illinois Mortgage Act deals specifically with the priorities of
security interests in the same collateral. The statute reads in part as
follows:
§ 15-1302. Certain Future Advances. (a) Advances Made After
Eighteen Months. Except as provided in subsection (b) of
Section 15-1302, as to any monies advanced or applied more
than 18 months after a mortgage is recorded, the mortgage
shall be a lien as to subsequent purchasers and judgment
creditors only from the time such monies are advanced or
applied. However, nothing in this Section shall affect any lien
arising or existing by virtue of the Mechanics' Lien Act.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) All monies advanced or applied pursuant to commitment, whenever advanced or applied, shall be a lien from the
time the mortgage is recorded. An advance shall be deemed
3. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1302 (West Supp. 1987) (added by P.A.
84-1462, § 2, eff. July 1, 1987).
In Illinois, as in other states, the courts have long recognized the validity of
future advance mortgages. Freutel v. Schmitzht, 299 Ill. 320, 132 N.E. 534
(1921);
Preble v. Conger, 66 Ill. 370 (1872); Lundy v. Messer, 25 11. App. 2d
513, 167
N.E.2d 278 (2d Dist. 1960). 1 REEVE, ILLINOIs LAW OF MORTGAGES AND FoR.ECLOSURES
164 et. seq. (1932). Incidentally, the use of the word "contemporaneously" found
in
§ (b)(l) of the Exceptions has troubled some practitioners due to the term's
imprecision. The American Heritage Dictionary, for example, defines the word
as "happening during the same period of time." But "contemporaneous" is not synonymous
with "simultaneous." For example, an essay on contemporary poetry would
cover a
span of years. A commitment always calls for a mortgage that conveys a marketable
title. Those documents exist in the same time frame.
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made pursuant to commitment only if the mortgagee has
bound itself to make such advance in the mortgage or in an
instrument executed contemporaneously with, and referred to
in, the mortgage, whether or not a subsequent event of default
or other event not within the mortgagee's control has relieved
or may relieve the mortgagee from its obligation.
(2) All monies advanced or applied, whenever advanced
or applied, in accordance with the terms of a reverse mortgage
shall be a lien from the time the mortgage is recorded.
(3) All monies advanced or applied in accordance with
the terms of a revolving credit arrangement secured by a
mortgage as authorized by law shall be a lien from the time
the mortgage is recorded.
(4) All interest which in accordance with the terms of a
mortgage is accrued or added to the principal amount secured
by the mortgage, whenever added, shall be a lien from the
time the mortgage is recorded.
(5) All monies advanced by the mortgagee in accordance
with the terms of a mortgage to (i) preserve or restore the
mortgaged real estate, (ii) preserve the lien of the mortgage or
shall be a
the priority thereof or (iii) enforce the mortgage,
4
lien from the time the mortgage is recorded.
To understand the construction loan revisions, one must first
understand the pre-revision law. For this reason, a discussion of the
law as it was prior to the effective date of the Mortgage Act is
warranted. Much of the discussion will be in terms of the construction
loan; particularly the loan involved in a large scale development, and,
more particularly, with the distressed project, where the lender is
compelled to take over and complete the project.
PRIORITY IN CONSTRUCTION

LOANS

Virtually every construction loan agreement or loan commitment
will contain a clause authorizing the lender to discontinue disbursing
funds if the mortgagor is guilty of a default.' Usually the "events of
default" clause is set forth in some detail. It will explain the methods
of disbursing funds as the construction progresses, the events which
may constitute a default on the part of the borrower and the remedies
4. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1302 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
5. Kratovil & Werner, supra note 1, at 315; P. RoHAN, REAL ESTATE FINACING
§ 3.05(4), at 3-51-3-54 (1973); P. RoHAN, CONSTRUCTION LENDING 96-106 (P.L.I.
1973).
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available to the lender upon such default. 6 One such remedy, invariably present, is the right to discontinue disbursements.
Even if no clause is present, the rule is that where one party to
a contract is guilty of a substantial default, the other may discontinue
performance. 7 The question, therefore, is what result a substantial
default on the part of the mortgagor will have on a future disbursement made by the mortgagee.
The important issue, which arises as to future advance mortgages,
is the priority of subsequent advances by the lender over interests in
the property which arise between the time the mortgage is recorded
and the making of the advance. Consider the following example:
Bank A records a construction mortgage on February 1, 1988, and
makes a contemporaneous advance of $100,000. The mortgage also
secures future advances. On March 1, 1988, construction begins. On
June 1, 1988, X obtains a judgment lien against the mortgagor. On
July 1, 1988, Bank A makes another disbursement on the construction
mortgage. Is Bank A's July 1st advance prior to the judgment lien
claim filed June 1st?
Tim

"OBLIGATORY-OPTIONAL"

TEST

In answering this question, most states have attempted to distinguish between future advances which are obligatory and those which
are optional.' The advance is "obligatory" if the mortgagee became
contractually committed to make the future advance before the rights
of the second party attached, even though the mortgagee makes the
payout after the lien of the subsequent interest has attached to the
mortgaged property. 9 When the mortgagee is obligated to make future
disbursements, the general, if not universal, rule is that the advance
6. MODERN MORTGAGE LAW, supra note 2, § 25.12, at 374.
7. 1 A. CoaIN, CORaIN ON CONTRACTS ch. 32 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 252(1) (1979). The "events of default" clause makes it unnecessary
for the lender to argue what rights he might have under contract law.
8. See supra note 3. For discussions of future advance mortgages see generally
Kratovil & Werner, supra note 1; Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances,
21 Mo. L. REv. 209 (1956); Urban, Future Advances Lending in North Carolina, 13
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 297 (1977); Skipworth, Should Construction Lenders Lose
Out on Voluntary Advances If a Loan Turns Sour? 5 REAL EST. L.J. (1977); Moore,
Seeking Firmer Ground: Mortgages to Secure Future Advances and the Priorities
Quagmire, 12 SUFFOLK L. REv. 445 (1978); Smith and Cobb, Questions of Priority
Between Mechanic's Liens and Construction Loan Mortgages, 38
oG ST. L.J. 3
(1977); Comment, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances Problems of Priority and
the Doctrine of Economic Necessity, 46 Miss L.J. 433 (1975).
9. MODERN MORTGAGE LAW, supra note 2, § 11.01, at 159.
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has priority over the subsequent lien interest. 0 The future advance
will relate back to the date of the recording of the mortgage." The
rationale for this doctrine is that the obligation of the mortgagee is
fixed at the time the mortgage is executed, and the fact that the
money does not change hands until some later date is irrelevant. The
obligation to disburse supplies a mortgage debt as of the recording of
the mortgage.
A problem is created, however, for construction lenders where
the future disbursements are deemed optional. Advances may be
considered "optional" if the mortgagee may at his election, under
the events of default clause, determine if a disbursement should be
made, an event of default having occurred.' 2 To be sure, if the
mortgage advances are deemed optional, many jurisdictions nevertheless hold that subsequent mortgage advances enjoy priority over
subsequent non-mortgage liens intervening between the execution of
the mortgage and the making of the advances, unless the advances
were made with actual notice of the intervening lien. 3
The dilemma of the construction lender now becomes more
obvious. But of far greater importance is the rule that permits an
obligatory advance mortgage to be converted into an optional advance
mortgage by the very circumstances that occasioned the construction
lender to originally seek the protection of the obligatory advances
doctrine. Events of default are always present in a distressed project.
A good many courts have said that advances made by a construction lender after a mechanic's lien or other lien has been filed is,
10. Kratovil & Werner, supra note 1.
11. MODERN MORTGAGE LAW, supra note 2, § 11.01, at 159.
12. Kratovil & Werner, supra note 1. A few cases go further and hold that
even where the advances are originally obligatory, if the mortgagor is guilty of a
substantial breach of his obligations under the construction loan agreement, all
advances made thereafter are optional and, thereafter, subject to all subsequent
mechanics' liens. Annotation, Priority Between Mechanics' Liens and Advances Made
Under Previously Executed Mortgages, 80 A.L.R. 2d 179, 201 (1961).
13. Kratovil & Werner, supra note 1; Annotation, Priority Between Mechanics'
Liens and Advances Made Under Previously Executed Mortgages, 80 A.L.R. 2d 179,
201 (1961). This exception has little force. Each month the lender, for example, sends
out an inspector to see if the new plumbing is installed. If the answer is affirmative,
how can the lender claim that he had no knowledge of the plumber's claim? Illinois
cases have held that the subsequent purchaser is put on notice of prior interests if by
the exercise of ordinary prudence and caution he could have discovered the interest,
see e.g., Anthony v. Wheeler, 130 Ill. 238, 22 N.E. 494 (1899); Morrison v. Kelly,
22 Ill. 610 (1859), or if he is aware of facts which would put a prudent man on
inquiry, see, e.g., German-American Nat'l Bank of Lincoln v. Martin, 277 Ill. 629,
115 N.E. 721 (1917).
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under the events of default clause, no longer considered "obligatory"
but rather is now an "optional" advance. An example of a catastrophic result which befell a lender can be found in Home Savings
and Loan Assoc. v. Sullivan, 4 where the court held advances to be
optional because a condition of the mortgage allowed the mortgagee
to withhold disbursements until it could be ascertained that (1) all
laborers and materialmen were paid and (2) the building reached a
stage of completion satisfactory to the loan company. In J. L Kislak
Mortgage Corp. v. William Matthews Builder Inc.,"5 disbursements
were rendered optional by a provision in the construction loan agreement which stated that the disbursements would not be made until
the mortgagor provided the lender with satisfactory documentation
showing that prior disbursements had been properly utilized to pay
mechanics and materialmen. 6 And in New York & Suburban Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n. v. Fi-Pen Realty Co.,' 7 advances were .held
to be optional because of a provision of the construction loan
agreement which provided that on the default of the borrower, the
obligation of the mortgagee to disburse the funds ceased.' 8 Case law,
then, serves to demonstrate the inadequacy of the obligatory-optional
test, as it fails at what would seem to be the very time it is needed.
Many mortgagees who would wish to continue disbursing funds so
that the building could be completed, even after a default on the part
of the borrower, have found that under the events of default clause
operated to render advances made thereafter optional.
STATUTES AS PRECEDENT

Lawyers often engage in exhaustive searches for cases "on point"
to serve as precedent for legal arguments asserted and conclusions
drawn. Too often, they ignore the precedential value of legislation.
14. 140 Okla. 300, 284 P. 30 (1929).
15. 287 A.2d 686 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972), aff'd, 303 A.2d 648 (Del. 1973).
16. See also Community Lumber Co. v. California Publishing Co., 215 Cal.
274, 10 P.2d 60 (1932), where it was held that payment conditioned upon the
satisfaction of intervening mechanic's liens rendered disbursements non-compulsory.
17. 133 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
18. See also National of Washington Bank v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d
886, 506 P.2d 20 (1973). The inconsistencies which have developed around the
obligatory-optional test are not confined to events of default cases. It has been held
that a construction loan disbursement made before it was due was optional. Housing
Mortgage Corp. v. Allied Const. Inc., 374 Pa. 312, 97 A.2d 802 (1953). Many cases
are collected in Annotation, Priority Between Mechanics' Liens and Advances Made
Under Previously Executed Mortgages, 80 A.L.R. 2d 179, 201 (1961).
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Statutes relating to kindred legislation furnish premises for reasoning

which are superior to those obtained in prior judicial precedents. 9
Increasingly, lawyers are realizing that reasoning by analogy from

statutes is a successful method of legal argument. Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Property adopts this view. 20 The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) has been increasingly utilized as precedent for
legal issues not governed by its terms. 2' By drawing analogies to the

U.C.C. implied warranty of merchantability, for example, courts have

found that the builder-vendor of a new home impliedly warrants that
the house is fit for the purpose of living in it.22 Thus, courts are
applying a statute which deals with chattels to a real property situation. Lawyers should readily recognize the need for treating as precedential statutes that deal with the precise philosophy presented in the
case at bar. A state cannot have two conflicting policies on the same
principle.
ILLINOIS STATUTE (EARLY LEGISLATION)

In Illinois, some future advance priority rules became fixed by a
statute adopted in 193 1.23 The Illinois statute specifically provided
19. Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning,

65 COLUM. L. REv. 880, 881 (1965); In 1908, Dean Roscoe Pound proposed that, for

precedent purposes, statutes deserve as much respect as case law. Pound, Common
Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 407 (1908); See also Stone, The
Common Law in the United States, 50 HAv. L. REv. 4 (1936) (Chief Justice Stone
encouraged courts to treat statutes as precedents).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT VII (1977).
Note the change this could make in legal research. A precedent decided in 1950 which
is directly on point may become valueless as precedent, even though Shepard's shows

it as unreversed, if an analogous statute expressing a conflicting policy now exists.
The analogous statute, like the U.C.C. for example, may not even be placed in the
real estate section of the statutes.
21. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88,
115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974). (Court drew an analogy between the U.C.C.'s requirement
of notice of breach of warranty in sales of goods transactions and notice in buildervendor/vendee transactions); Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d
6, 338 N.Y.S. 2d 67 (1972) (court recognized that the U.C.C., by its terms, applies
only to the sales of goods, yet applied the U.C.C.'s policy of nonenforcement of
unconscionable contracts to a lease agreement).
22. Petersen v. Hubschman Const. Co., Inc., 76 Ill. 2d. 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154
(1979) (The court determined that an analogy should be drawn between a U.C.C.
warranty of merchantability in the sales of goods and a proposed warranty in the
sales of houses by builders-vendors). More than forty states are committed to the
view that the U.C.C. is precedential. Kratovil, Unconscionability: Real Property
Lawyers Confront a New Problem, 21 JOHN MARSH. L. REv. 1 (1987).
23. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, para. 37a (1985):

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

that if the lender, at the time the mortgage was recorded, was already
obligated to make future advances, those advances had priority as of
the date of recording the mortgage. 24 That was, of course, consistent
with the theory of obligatory advance priority as of the time the
obligation arose.
Under the 1931 statute, optional advances made within eighteen
months after the recording of the mortgage take priority over intervening interests are recorded, and even though the lender had knowledge of the intervening interests when the advance was made. 25

37a.

Time when mortgage lien attaches
§ 39 Every mortgage or trust deed in the nature of a mortgage shall,
as to lands not registered under the provisions of an act entitled "An Act
Concerning Land Titles," approved and in force May 1, 1897, as subsequently amended, from the time it is filed of record, and in the case of
lands registered under the provisions of said act entitled "An Act Concerning
Land Titles," approved and in force May 1, 1897, as subsequently amended,
from the time it is registered, or from the time of the filing of a caveat as
provided in said Act, be a lien upon the real estate thereby conveyed situated
in the county in which such instrument is recorded or registered, for all
monies advanced or applied or which may at any time thereafter be advanced
or applied thereunder on account of the principal indebtedness which such
mortgage or trust deed shall purpose it to secure and including such other
monies which may at any time be advanced or applied as are authorized by
the provisions of such mortgage or trust deed or as are authorized by law;
provided, that as to subsequent purchasers and judgment creditors, every
such mortgage or trust deed shall, as to the monies advanced or applied
thereunder on account of the principal indebtedness evidenced by the notes,
bonds or other instruments therein described and thereby secured, be a lien
only from the time such monies are advanced or applied, unless such monies
are advanced or applied within eighteen months after the date of such
recording or registration, or filing of such caveat, or unless the mortgagee
is by contract obligated to make such advances or applications, and provided
further that nothing in this Act contained shall affect any lien arising or
existing by virtue of "An Act to revise the law in relation to mechanics'
liens." To whom, what for, and when lien is given; who is a contractor;
area covered by and extent of lien; when the lien attaches. ...
Id. (emphasis added).
24. Id.

25. The statute is not easy to read. The relevant language is as follows:

Every mortgage . . . shall . . . from the time it is filed of record . .. be a
lien upon the real estate thereby conveyed ... for all monies advanced or

applied or which may at any time thereafter be advanced or applied
thereunder on account of the principal indebtedness which such mortgage
...or as are authorized by law; provided, that as to subsequent purchasers

and judgment creditors, every ...

mortgage .

.

. shall, as to the monies

advanced or applied thereunder on account of the principal indebtedness
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Absolute priority for optional advances for eighteen months may have
been intended as a way of avoiding the difficulties inherent in deter-

mining whether an advance is obligatory. After eighteen months,

optional advances lost the absolute priority granted by the Illinois
statute so that, as already noted, the intervening interests take priority
26
over the future advances lender.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

As a result of the judicial nit-picking over the "obligatory-

optional" advance controversy, a breakthrough occurred in the 1972
amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code. In § 9-105(1)(k), the
amended Code provides that an advance under a construction mortgage is made "pursuant to a commitment" if the mortgagee "has
bound himself to make it, whether or not a subsequent event of
default or other event not within his control has relieved or may
' 27
relieve him from his obligation.
The revisions resolved the lien priority conflict as to fixtures and
chattels in favor of the construction lender. And, as stated in the
comments to the 1972 Official Text, this is the law whether the
advances under the construction loan are to be deemed as optional or
obligatory.

2

1

To make this point perfectly clear, § 9-105(1)(k) has provided
that an advance under a construction loan is obligatory even if the
"event of default or other event not within his control has relieved
evidenced by the notes, bonds or other instruments therein described and
thereby secured, be a lien only from the time such monies are advanced or
applied, unless such monies are advanced or applied within eighteen months
after the date of such recording . . .or unless the mortgagee is by contract

obligated to make such advances or applications ....
ch. 30, para. 37a (1985).

ILL. REV. STAT.

26. See, e.g. Home Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Sullivan, 140 Okla. 300, 284 P.
30 (1929). See also ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 30, para. 37a (1985). The concept of protecting
mortgage money advanced within eighteen months is not particularly helpful today,
when construction of large projects often exceeds that period. It can be helpful on
home sales, where defective documentation makes the advance an "optional" one.
See supra note 3.
27. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(K) (1972). This author served on a subcommittee that
urged the inclusion of this language. The actual language, as I recall, was drafted by
the late Professor Coogan. Identical language is found in U.L.T.A. § 1-201(14), in
U.S.O.L.T.A. § 1-201(14) and in the UNuI. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT § 111(19),
7a U.L.A. 45 (1985 & Supp. 1987). Thus the Illinois language now tracks four
uniform acts and Professor Coogan's remarks are relevant to them all. See supra
note 3 and accompanying text. See also Coogan, infra note 31.
28. U.C.C. § 9-312, comment 5 (1972).
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him or may relieve him from his obligation. 129 No one has stated the
case for this language better than the late Professor Coogan:
Suppose a building construction lender is excused under a
security agreement from making further advances if any part
of his debtor's assets are subjected to a lien obtained by legal
or equitable proceedings involving a claim of $50,000 or more,
and a creditor with such a claim levies. The lender, after
surveying both his own position as a substantial creditor of
the debtor and the probable strength of the lien creditor's
claim, decides that he, as an existing creditor, and the debtor
will both be worse off if he elects to take advantage of his
out. He consequently makes the advance to complete the
building. Under proposed 9-105(1)(k) the lender's advance is
entitled to the advantages of one made pursuant to a commitment, notwithstanding the out of which he did not take
advantage.
The distinction between advances under commitment and
optional advances no doubt must arise out of the nature of
the conditions which will and will not excuse the lender's
performance. Clearly, a lender's commitment to make a future
advance which excuses performance if he dislikes the way the
debtor has parted his hair on the day the latter asks for the
advance is not a real commitment. It is quite a different
matter, however, if the lender's commitment to make an
advance is excused only if the debtor's balance sheet, audited
by an independent accountant, shows that the debtor's net
current asset-debt ratio has fallen below an agreed-upon,
reasonable standard.30
No party to a contract should be forced to declare the other
party in default. The courts should encourage, not discourage, performance of contracts, especially since the construction lender has no
real choice in this matter. He is under an economic compulsion to
complete the building, just as he is under an economic compulsion to
pay insurance or real estate taxes if the mortgagor fails to pay them.3
Advances made to complete the building under construction will
maintain priority over most liens arising in the course of construction.
29. Id. at § 9-105 (1)(k) (1972).
30. Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REv. 477, 506-07 (1973).
31. MODERN MORTGAGE LAW, supra note 2, at § 375.
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THE UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTION ACT

The Uniform Land Transaction Act (ULTA) was promulgated
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) in 1975 and was amended in 1977.32 With respect to the
discussion contained herein, the ULTA is substantially patterned after
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code as amended.33 Article 3
of the ULTA deals with security interests and their priority.3 4 The

32. ULTA § 3-301(1) deals with priorities but must be read with the definitions
sections. The test is as follows:
[Priority Between Conflicting Security Interests in Same Collateral]
(a) So long as conflicting security interests remain unrecorded, the first
to attach has priority.
(b) A recorded security interest takes priority as of the date of its
recording as to advances or obligations thereafter made or incurred after
the security agreement:
(1) if made pursuant to a commitment entered into before the secured
party had knowledge of an intervening interest, to the extent of
the outstanding advances or obligations that do not exceed the
maximum amount stated in the record;
(2) if not made pursuant to a commitment made before the secured
party had knowledge of an intervening interest, to the extent of
advances or obligations outstanding when the secured party obtained knowledge of the intervening interest and that do no exceed
the maximum amount stated in the record;
(3) if made or incurred for the reasonable protection of the security
interest in the real estate, such as payment for real property taxes,
hazard insurance premiums, or maintenance charges imposed under
a condominium declaration or a restrictive covenant, whether or
not the advances or obligations exceed the maximum amount stated
in the instrument and although the secured creditor had knowledge
of the intervening interest; or
(4) if made under a construction security interest to enable completion
of the agreed improvement of the real estate, whether or not the
advances or obligations exceed the secured maximum amount
stated in the instrument or the secured creditor had knowledge of
the intervening interest.
(c) In all other cases the priority of a security interest and of an
assignment of rent is determined according to the law governing recording
and priority.
Id. And § 1-201(14) defines "pursuant to a commitment" in language virtually
identical with that found in the 1972 UCC amendments.'UCC § 1-201(14) (1972).
33. Benfield, The Future Advances Lender: Status Under Present Illinois Law
and Under ULTA and USOLTA, 1981 So. ILL. U.L.J. 451, 459 (1981). Uniform acts
can be cited as authority even in a state that has not adopted the act. Redarowitz v.
Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 224 (1982); In re Estate of Thompson, 66
Ohio St. 2d 433, 423 N.E.2d 90 (1981).
34. See supra note 27.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act (USOLTA) was also
patterned after Article 9 of the UCC and promulgated by the NCCUSL

in 1977. 31 USOLTA deals with the conveying and recording systems,
priorities, record title and mechanic's liens.3 6

The USOLTA future advance pri6rity rules are nearly identical
to those in the Uniform Land Security Act." Advances made pursuant
to a commitment have priority over intervening interests, with no
consideration of whether the future advances lender had knowledge

of the intervening interest when the advance was made.38 Truly
optional advances have priority over intervening interest only if, at
35. USOLTA § 3-209 which contains language identical to that in ULTA § 3301(b) reads as follows:
Notwithstanding Sections 3-201 and 3-202, but subject to the provisions
on priority of construction liens (Section 5-209), a recorded security interest
takes priority as of the date of its recording as to advances or obligations
thereafter made or incurred under the security agreement:
[Priority of Advances Under a Recorded Security Interest]
(1) if made pursuant to a commitment entered into before the secured
party had knowledge of an intervening interest, to the extent of
the outstanding advances or obligations that do not exceed the
maximum amount stated in the record;
(2) if not made pursuant to a commitment made before the secured
party had knowledge of an intervening interest, to the extent of
advances or obligations outstanding when the secured party obtained knowledge of the intervening interest and that do not exceed
the maximum amount stated in the record;
(3) if made or incurred for the reasonable protection of the security
interest in the real estate, such as payment for real property taxes,
hazard insurance premiums, or maintenance charges imposed under
a condominium declaration or a restrictive covenant, whether or
.not the advances or obligations exceed the maximum amount stated
in the instrument and although the secured creditor had knowledge
of the intervening interest; or
(4) If made under a construction security interest to enable completion
of the agreed improvement of the real estate, whether or not the
advances or obligations exceed the secured maximum amount
stated in the instrument or the secured creditor had knowledge of
the intervening interest.

Id.

36. Id.

37. For a discussion of future advance mortgages under ULTA and USOLTA,
see Benfield, The Future Advance Lender: Statutes Under Present Illinois Law and
Under ULTA and USOLTA, 1981 So. ILL. U.L.J. 451 (1981); De Mio, Future
Advances Under the ULTA and the USOLTA: The Construction Lender Receives a
New Status, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1027 (1977).
38. Id. See supra note 27.
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the time they were made, the lender had no knowledge of the
intervening interests.3 9 Courts, including those in Illinois, now cite the
uniform acts as authority. 4° For this reason, the language of the
Uniform Commercial Code should be followed nationwide.
THE UNIFORM LAND SECURITY ACT

The Uniform Land Security Interest Act was approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1985. 41 It is intended to make uniform throughout the country the
law relating to real estate mortgages. The need for such a uniform
law is convincingly argued in the Act.4 2 Section 302 follows the general
scheme of ULTA and USOLTA. 4 The general definitions section is
of special interest. An advance made pursuant to a commitment is
39. Id.

40. Redarowitz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 184, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (1982).
41. UNIF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT, 7a U.L.A. 95 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
42. Id. at 96-97.
43. Id. § 302 reads as follows:
§ 302. Future Advances
(a) An obligation secured by a security agree ment may include future
advances, whether or not future advances are made pursuant to commitment.
However, except for future advances made to protect collateral, the maximum amount of future advances secured at any time may not exceed the
maximum amount stated in the agreement, together with interest accrued
but unpaid on those advances.
(b) A future advance made to protect collateral is secured by a security
agreement even though the agreement does not provide for future advances,
or the advances cause the total obligation to exceed the maximum amount
stated in the security agreement.
(c) [Except as expressly set forth in (cite reference to state mechanics'
lien laws, if any)] a future advance made under a recorded security agreement
takes priority as of the date of the recording:
(1) if made pursuant to a commitment entered into before the
secured creditor had knowledge of an intervening interest to the
extent of the outstanding future advances that do not exceed the
maximum amount stated in the record;
(2) if not made pursuant to a commitment entered into before
the secured creditor had knowledge of an intervening interest, to
the extent of future advances that are outstanding when the secured
creditor obtained knowledge of the intervening interest and do not
exceed the maximum amount stated in the record.
(d) A future advance made to protect collateral takes priority as of the
date a security agreement is recorded, even though the secured creditor has
knowledge of anintervening interest at the time the future advance is made.
Id. § 302, at 120-21.
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defined in Section 111(19). 4 It tracks with like definitions found in
the other uniform acts.
Comment 4(b) to Section 302 is as follows:
Subsection (c) is based upon the familiar rule that "obligatory" advances take priority as of the date of commitment,
while "nonobligatory" advances generally take priority as of

the date of disbursement. The phrase "pursuant to commitment" is defined in Section 111(19) and that definition is
intended to eliminate many of the problems created by the
45
"obligatory" test.

It is therefore evident that this Act, like all those following the

U.C.C. Amendments of 1972, has embraced the philosophy expressed

in the Tennessee Law Review article heretofore cited. 46 The "obligatory advance" controversies are headed for oblivion.

THE NEW ILLINOIS MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE ACT

This article has deliberately postponed previous discussion of
much of the new Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act. 47 This Act, which

went into effect on July 1, 1987, covers the priority problem specifi-

cally. Section 15-1302(b)(1) contains language virtually identical with

that contained in the U.C.C. as amended. 4 Indeed, this entire section

Id.

44. Id. § 111(19), at 106 states the following:
(19) An advance is made "pursuant to commitment" if the obligor has
bound itself to make it, whether or not a default or other event not within
its control has relieved or may relieve it from its obligation.

Section 111(12) likewise tracks with the other uniform acts.
(12) "Future advances made to protect collateral" means future advances made or incurred (i) for the reasonable protection of the security
interest in the collateral, such as payment of real property taxes, hazard
insurance premiums, or maintenance charges imposed under a common
interest community declaration or other restrictive covenant; or (ii) under a

Id.

security agreement created to enable completion of a contemplated improvement, that contains a legend on the first page clearly stating it is a
"Construction Security Agreement" and secures an obligation which the
debtor incurred for the purpose of making an improvement of the real estate
in which the security interest is given.

1987).

45. Id. § 302, comment 4 (emphasis added).
46. Kratovil & Werner, supra note 1.
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-101 et. seq. (1985) (amended July 1,
48. See supra note 3.
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deals with mortgage priority. Thus advances made pursuant to a
commitment now obtain priority as of the date of the recording of
the mortgage. This brings Illinois into harmony with the thinking
espoused by the Uniform Commissioners in the previously mentioned
four acts. Note also that the Illinois Act discards the expression
"obligatory advance" in favor of the expression "advance pursuant
to commitment." ' 49 The Act is not retroactive, however. As to mortgages taking effect prior to July 1987 the situation will be governed
by analogy to the U.C.C. provision and the Uniform Land Transactions Act. At this point, no doubt, our courts will also be influenced
by the new law. The philosophy expressed in a statute can be applied
retrospectively.5 0
MECHANICS' LIENS

As the priority of mechanics' liens, that is, of course, a matter
that in Illinois is governed by the Illinois Mechanics' Lien Act."
Under the Act the lien relates back to the date of the contract for the
improvement. 5 2 Since the lender will not commit to make a construction loan until he examines the construction contract, such liens always
prime the construction mortgage in Illinois and are shown on the title
commitment and policy. As construction proceeds, the title company
makes a periodic check of the lien waivers and gives coverage jagainst
mechanics' liens to the extent of valid lien waivers submitted.
Most states have mechanics' lien laws far more liberal than the
Illinois law. In those states, even in the absence of a mortgage act
like that adopted in Illinois, some title companies may be able, on
the theories expressed herein, to insure over mechanics' liens occurring
after the mortgage has been recorded, as long as the mortgage is
recorded prior to the visible commencement of construction. 3
As to liens other than mechanics' liens, courts can also rely on
the rule. A mortgagee who takes over the job of completing the
building is obliged to complete it, and advances so made should be
treated as obligatory advances.5 4 This concept is also embodied in the
new Illinois Foreclosure Act. 5 Liens other than mechanics' liens,
judgment liens, for example, also come under the new language in
49. Id.

50. See Schroeder v. Benz, 9 Ill. 2d 589, 138 N.E.2d 496 (1956).
51. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 82, para. 1 et. seq. (1985).
52. Crowen v. Meyer, 342, Ill. 46, 174 N.E. 55 (1930).
53. 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 200, at 754 (1948).

54. Central Pa. Sav. Assn. v. Carpenters of Pa., 463 A.2d 414, 417 (1983).
55. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1302(b)(5) (West Supp. 1987).
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Illinois.56 This is certainly a long step toward a sensible solution of
the mortgage priority problem.
CONCLUSION

The new Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act moves Illinois into
modern times so far as the obligatory advance doctrine is concerned.
Construction lenders must be pleased with this development, and
more new construction should find its way into Illinois. The explicit
provisions that liens attaching after a commitment is made do not
prime the mortgage that goes into default is Illinois law now, and
under pressure from the Uniform Commissioners is bound to be
adopted generally. Indeed, under the doctrine that a statute is precedential it is already the law in all states that have adopted the 1972
Amendments to the U.C.C. Mortgage law in Illinois has now moved
toward a rational solution of the future advances problem.
It seems inevitable that the doctrine that statutes are precedential
will be universally adopted. American law cannot ignore the Restatements. This will have a profound effect on legal research. No doubt
Colorado had dozens of decisions of its Supreme Court laying down
the doctrine of caveat emptor. Yet when push came to shove, the
court adopted a philosophy expressed in a statute that had nothing to
do with sales of real estate (the U.C.C.) and applied that philosophy
to the sale of new homes. Over forty states have followed suit. This
means that finding another case directly in point on a current problem
is a step with minimal viability today. The state's statutes, perhaps
the regulations also, must be searched for later expressions of a
different philosophy or policy. And the statute may have no relation
to the subject matter of your current problem. Courts are obliged to
follow the public policy of the state, however expressed.

56. Id. at para. 15-1302(b)(1).

